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Abstract 
One of the reasons why regulators are hesitant about permitting price competition in 
healthcare markets is that it may damage quality when information is poor. Evidence 
on whether this fear is well-founded is scarce. We provide evidence using a reform 
that permitted Dutch health insurers and hospitals to freely negotiate prices for 
elective procedures. Unlike previous research that has relied on indicators of the 
quality of urgent treatments, we take advantage of the plausible absence of selection 
bias in our setting to identify the effect on quality of non-acute hip replacements. 
Using administrative data on all admissions to Dutch hospitals, we find no evidence 
that increased exposure to price competition reduces quality measured by readmission 
rates, despite the lack of publicly available information on this outcome. In fact, there 
is evidence of a temporary, positive impact on quality. Our estimated null effect over 
the full post-liberalization period is robust.  
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I. Introduction 
Health systems around the world are increasingly designed to encourage competition between 
providers in the hope that this will improve quality of care while slowing the growth of health 
spending (Propper, 2011). When prices are regulated, providers are forced to compete on 
quality to attract patients or contracts with insurers. But when prices are unregulated, the 
effect of competition on quality is less clear. If demand is more responsive to price than to 
quality, then the optimal competitive strategy will involve driving down the price and 
sacrificing quality (Gaynor, 2006). This is a plausible scenario when information on quality is 
poor, much of the variation in quality is unobservable and so demand is insensitive to it. 
However, not-for-profit healthcare providers may not adopt the most competitive strategy. 
Their intrinsic motivation may lead them to maintain quality even if this means forgoing 
opportunities to gain a competitive advantage by cutting prices at the expense of quality. 
Whether quality suffers in competitive healthcare markets with unregulated prices is an 
empirical question. To date, evidence to answer it is sparse. A highly regulated form of price 
competition introduced in the UK National Health Service (NHS) at a time when there was 
poor information on quality was found to be (weakly) associated with worse health outcomes 
from hospital treatment  (Propper et al., 2008; 2004). Health outcomes also deteriorated in one 
US state when prices were deregulated in the hospital care market (Volpp et al., 2003). 
However, policy and market changes that occurred at the same time as the deregulation may 
have confounded the effect of deregulating prices.   
This paper presents evidence on the impact of unconstrained price competition on the 
quality of hospital care delivered in the Dutch healthcare market in which insurers compete 
for customers and providers compete for contracts with insurers. We estimate the effect of 
moving from financing hospitals though prospective budgeting to allowing insurers and 
hospitals to freely negotiate prices in contracts for the delivery of certain medical procedures. 
We identify the effect of this price liberalization by exploiting variation in its consequences 
across hospitals differentiated by the concentration of the market in which they operate. 
Assuming that free negotiation of prices creates greater competitive pressure where the 
market is less concentrated, difference-in-differences (DID) across more and less concentrated 
markets can identify the effect of liberalizing prices and this can be interpreted as the effect of 
exposure to greater price competition. This is similar to the approach taken by Propper et al. 
(2008), Cooper et al. (2011) and Gaynor et al. (2013) to evaluate impact of competition in the 
UK NHS.  
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Most studies of the impact of hospital competition use mortality after acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI) as an indicator of quality (see e.g. Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2013; 
Kessler & Geppert, 2005; Mutter et al., 2011; Romano & Balan, 2011). The reason is that the 
urgency of AMI treatment greatly reduces the risk of selection bias. Patients are taken to the 
nearest hospital, which is obliged to treat them. There is little or no opportunity for difficult-
to-treat patients selecting hospitals that deviate from the average in both quality and exposure 
to competition. And there is little scope for those hospitals to cherry pick the easier cases. The 
downside of this empirical strategy is that it identifies the impact of competition on the quality 
of a treatment that is demand inelastic with respect to quality. It identifies the impact of 
competition on quality only in so far as the pressure to compete in the delivery of some 
procedures affects the general management of a hospital and this feeds through to treatments, 
such as AMI, that are largely shielded from competition. This leaves us with little or no 
evidence on the effect of competition on treatments, such as elective surgeries, that hospitals 
directly compete for and that potentially exhibit much greater demand sensitivity to quality 
than is true of urgent procedures (Skellern, 2017; Gravelle et al., 2014; Bevan & Skellern, 
2011). Provided quality is sufficiently observable, competition has the potential to impact 
more positively on the quality of elective surgery than on the quality of acute surgery (Colla 
et al., 2016).  
We present evidence of the impact of competition on the quality of a procedure -- non-
acute hip replacements – over which hospitals directly compete, including through freely 
negotiated prices. We use unplanned readmission rates to indicate quality. Higher readmission 
rates following hip replacement have been shown to be related to suboptimal quality (e.g. 
Rosen et al., 2013; Mokhtar et al., 2012). In England, providers facing more competition were 
found to face a more elastic demand with respect to quality (and waiting times) for elective 
hip replacements than providers facing less competition (Moscelli et al., 2016). 
The institutional context and our empirical strategy give us the option to identify the effect 
of competition on the quality of an elective procedure without running much risk of selection 
bias. Previous studies, particularly those of the UK NHS, have identified the impact of 
competition by exploiting reforms that intensified competitive pressure through increasing the 
scope for patient choice of the provider (Cooper et al., 2011 and Gaynor et al., 2013). These 
studies avoided using outcomes of elective procedures to measure quality because of the 
considerable potential for selection bias. The Dutch healthcare market reform we exploit 
introduced price competition but left patient choice unaffected. Before and after the 
liberalization of prices patients and insurers had unconstrained choice of provider. But the 
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absence of any information on hip replacement readmission rates made it impossible for 
patients and insurers to select a hospital on the basis of the outcome. Further, to identify the 
effect of competition we separate hospitals into two broad (treatment/comparison) groups 
according to the concentration of the market in which they operate. If there was any selection 
correlated with the outcome, it would most likely involve switching between neighboring 
hospitals that will belong to the same group, which would not induce selection bias given our 
strategy. Baseline patient characteristics are similar across the treatment and comparison 
groups, changes in these characteristics do not differ between the groups and conditioning on 
these characteristics has little or no impact on the estimates. If the estimates are insensitive to 
conditioning observables, it is unlikely that they are even moderately biased by correlated 
unobservables.  
Given that information on the quality of hospital care was absent at the time free price 
negotiation was introduced in the Dutch hospital market, there was a risk of a negative impact 
on quality if hospitals competed on price and neglected quality. We find no evidence of this. 
Our main point estimate is that exposure to price competition reduced the 90-day readmission 
rate of hospitals in less concentrated markets by almost 1 percentage point (baseline: 8.2 
percent) compared with hospitals in more concentrated markets that were exposed to less 
competitive pressure. But this estimate is not significantly different from zero. In the year 
immediately after prices were liberalized, we estimate that increased exposure to competition 
did significantly (p-value = 0.02) reduce the readmission rate. The finding that there was no 
significant, effect that persisted over the full post-reform period is robust to different 
definitions of market size and to using the 30-day, rather than 90-day, readmission rate. 
Hence, although competition was introduced in the market for a potentially demand sensitive 
elective procedure and information on its quality was absent when prices were made freely 
negotiable, the quality of care does not seem to have suffered. If anything, there was a 
temporary improvement in quality. While it is merely speculation, one possible explanation 
for this is that providers, who were contracting for the delivery of specific procedures for the 
first time, initially did not appreciate the extent to which insurers would focus on price in the 
(re)negotiation of contacts. Consequently, the hospitals exposed to greater competitive 
pressure were careful to maintain, or even improve, quality in the first year operating under 
the new contracting regime. Only later, when they witnessed insurers’ preoccupation with 
price, did they also concentrate on competing in that domain. More concretely, our study 
provides evidence that price competition in healthcare markets is not necessarily always at the 
expense of quality, even when information on quality is poor.  
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II. Competition and healthcare quality with unregulated prices: theory and evidence 
When prices are unregulated, the impact of competition on quality depends on how it affects 
the responsiveness of demand to quality relative to price. If consumers or insurers observe 
prices but have only imperfect information on quality, then competition might be expected to 
raise the price sensitivity relative to the quality sensitivity of demand, and so reduce quality. 
Gaynor (2006) makes this argument using an amended version of the Dorfman-Steiner 
condition (Dorfman & Steiner, 1954): 𝑧 = ௣
ௗ
∙ ఌ೥
ఌ೛
  where z is quality, p is price, d is the 
marginal cost of quality,  𝜀௭ is the elasticity of demand with respect to quality and 𝜀௣ is the 
elasticity with respect to price1. If competition exerts downward pressure on the price relative 
to the marginal cost and/or raises the magnitude of the price elasticity relative to the quality 
elasticity, then it will reduce quality (Gaynor et al., 2015). However, if quality becomes 
sufficiently observable, then competition could conceivably raise the quality elasticity relative 
to the price elasticity. Quality would increase, provided price does not fall relative to the 
marginal cost of quality.  
In the Netherlands, as in most high-income countries, consumers of healthcare can be 
expected to be rather price insensitive because of comprehensive health insurance with 
limited cost sharing. However, this does not imply that demand is perfectly price inelastic. 
Health insurers are sensitive to prices (Gowrisankaran et al., 2015). The reform we use for 
identification was intended to make insurers more price sensitive. It gave them the freedom to 
negotiate prices for specific procedures with individual hospitals. This price liberalization 
would be expected to increase the price elasticity of the insurers’ demand and push prices 
downward. According to the Dorfman-Steiner condition, quality would then suffer unless 
there was a sufficient countervailing increase in the quality elasticity2. This would occur only 
if quality was sufficiently observable such that insurers could monitor it and the new 
contracting arrangements gave them greater motivation and scope to pressure hospitals for 
quality improvements.  
The complexity of healthcare and its stochastic relationship with health outcomes makes 
measurement of its quality inherently difficult. This, together with a lack of published 
                                                            
1 Although Dorfman & Steiner (1954) model a monopolist’s behaviour, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000) show that the model is an 
approximation to the behaviour of an oligopolistic or monopolistically competitive firm if we think of the demand function as a reduced form 
demand. Hence, the model has relevance for imperfectly competitive healthcare markets (Gaynor, 2006; Gaynor et al., 2015). 
2 It is unlikely that hospitals deliberately set out to lower quality of care. Studies that investigate the competition-quality relationship often 
assume that in response to competitive pressure, hospitals cut services that affect quality outcomes (Propper et al., 2008; Bloom et al., 2015). 
Nonetheless, models on the relationship between competition and quality assume a direct relationship between competition and quality rather 
than between competition and effort. Gaynor and Town (2012) show that for the purpose of modeling the distinction between effort and 
quality of care is irrelevant. A given service level generates an expected level of outcome of care (e.g. mortality or a readmission) and 
therefore it does not matter whether a model assumes hospitals to choose quality of services or any other outcome (Gaynor & Town, 2012). 
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information on hospital quality both before and after the reform we examine, would be 
expected to result in hospitals exposed to greater competitive pressure shifting effort from 
maintaining poorly observed quality to cutting costs in order to become more price 
competitive (Propper et al., 2008). On the other hand, the new contracts involved hospitals 
and insurers negotiating for the first time over the delivery of specific procedures akin to 
diagnostic-related groups. Hospitals exposed to more competition might have exerted greater 
effort in improving the quality of these procedures for fear of losing a contract. Without 
experience of the weight the insurers would place on price relative to quality in contract 
renewal negotiations, the hospitals may have been motivated, at least initially, to ensure that 
price competitiveness was not achieved at the cost of quality. If this motivation was 
sufficiently strong, then potentially competition could even have raised quality. The effect of 
price competition on quality is therefore ambiguous. It depends on characteristics of the 
market, the observability of quality and the objective functions of the insurers and hospitals 
(Gaynor et al., 2015). 
Evidence on the effect of price competition on healthcare quality is scarce3. This is mainly 
because only a few countries permit free price negotiation in healthcare markets and data on 
the performance of private healthcare providers are typically not accessible. Using data from 
Southern California, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) find that increased competition for 
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) patients is correlated with reduced risk-adjusted 
hospital mortality for both pneumonia and AMI. Consistent with this, Sari (2002) uses a 
similar methodology based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) framework and 
finds that increased competition (lower hospital market share and market concentration) in 16 
US states is associated with fewer hospital complications. However, the internal validity of 
these studies can be doubted because of endogeneity problems that are known to beset the 
SCP approach (Gaynor & Town, 2012), and their external validity is limited because the 
HMO markets studied are very particular to the US hospital market in the 1990s.  
The few studies that exploit a policy change to identify the quality effect of a change in 
price competition are stronger with respect to internal validity but also difficult to generalize 
because the findings are obtained in specific settings with a particular design of price 
competition. Subject to this caveat, these studies generally find that price competition does 
damage hospital quality. Volpp et al. (2003) compare AMI mortality rates of New Jersey 
                                                            
3 There is more evidence on the impact of competition on quality when prices are regulated. Findings are mixed. Some studies find that 
competition improves quality in this context (Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2016; Gaynor et al., 2013; Gobillon & Milcent, 2017; 
Kessler & Geppert, 2005; Kessler & McClellan, 2000; Propper et al., 2010), others find evidence of the contrary (Moscelli et al., 2016b; 
Skellern, 2017), while one study finds no effect at all (Berta et al., 2016). 
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hospitals before and after the deregulation of prices in 1992 with those of New York hospitals 
where there was no deregulation. However, coincident to the reform, hospital prices were also 
pressured through rapid growth of large-volume buyers, such as HMOs, and large reductions 
in subsidies for hospital care of uninsured patients. The mortality rate of uninsured AMI 
patients increased in New Jersey relative to New York but it is not clear how much, if any, of 
this was attributable to the price deregulation. The switch from fixed budgets that hospitals 
received directly from the national government to negotiating over contracts with purchasing 
organizations in the British NHS in 1991 has been used to estimate the quality effect of a 
highly regulated form of price competition (Propper et al., 2004; 2008). The competition was 
highly regulated since contracts were written for blocks of services, including accident and 
emergency procedures and not for defined procedures, such as DRGs, and hospitals were not 
free to set prices. They were mandated to set price equal to average costs, had to publish the 
price and were not permitted to carry surpluses or losses across financial years. However, 
some form of price competition was possible at the specialty level because arbitrary 
apportionment of costs to a particular service made it difficult for the regulator to check on 
adherence to the pricing rule at that level (Propper et al., 2008). There is some evidence that 
prices in this period were indeed not solely determined by costs but were related to market 
forces (Propper, 1996). The evidence suggests that even this regulated form of price 
competition had a negative impact on quality (measured by AMI mortality rates), which is 
attributed to incentives for hospitals to compete on prices rather than quality when the 
available information on the latter is poor (Propper et al., 2004; 2008). If this highly regulated 
form of price competition can damage quality, then entirely free price competition could 
potentially be seriously detrimental to the quality of care delivered by hospitals. The 2005 
liberalization of price setting in the Dutch healthcare market allows us to test this hypothesis. 
Since there was no quality information available either publicly or to health insurers at the 
time of the reform, the risk of a negative impact on quality was substantial.  
III. Price competition in the Dutch healthcare market 
All Dutch hospitals are private nonprofit foundations. Before 2005, Dutch hospitals were 
financed by a prospective budgeting system with relatively stable revenue flows known at the 
beginning of each year. From 2005, revenues became contingent on contracts secured with 
individual health insurers. There were five health insurance companies plus a joint purchasing 
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cooperative of small health insurers in the market4. Hospitals and insurers negotiate over 
volume and quality of care per product, which is defined by a Diagnosis and Treatment 
Combination (DTC), the Dutch equivalent of a DRG5. These DTC products had no relation to 
the output parameters of the pre-reform hospital budgets (e.g. number of admissions and 
hospital days). In 2005, free negotiation of price was permitted in writing contracts for a 
subset of DTCs that accounted for about 10% of hospital revenues. This included non-acute 
hip replacements, which is the procedure we use to evaluate the impact of the introduction of 
price competition on quality. The number of DTCs for which free price setting was permitted 
was extended over time. In 2008, 20% of all hospital revenues were obtained from DTCs with 
negotiated prices. This fraction increased to 34% in 2009 and 70% in 2012. Because of the 
high overall number of DTCs, insurers and hospitals often negotiate over clusters of DTCs. 
However, contracting is done separately for high-revenue/high-volume products like non-
emergency hip replacements6.  
The goal of the contracting reform was to make insurers, acting as purchasing agents for 
their customers, more responsive to price, volume and quality. Health insurers were allowed 
to contract hospitals selectively, which would enable them to negotiate lower prices with 
selected hospitals. In a competitive insurance market, these lower prices would feed through 
to lower premiums (Ho, 2009). A major reform of the health insurance market in 2006 
increased price competition among health insurers, which were expected to put pressure on 
hospitals to cut their costs (Schut & Van de Ven, 2011). If consumers not only value lower 
premiums but also access to quality hospitals, then health insurers should compete both on 
premiums and the scope and quality of their provider networks (Determann et al., 2016). 
Hospitals are expected to compete on price and quality for inclusion in the insurers’ network.  
Existing evidence on the market response to the liberalization of prices in Dutch insurer-
hospital negotiation of contracts is limited. Qualitative examination of insurer-provider 
contracting suggests that price rather than quality has been the primary focus of the contract 
negotiations (Meijer et al., 2010; Ruwaard et al., 2014; Schut & Van de Ven, 2011). This is 
perhaps unsurprising given the dearth of information available on quality. For example, 
hospital-specific readmission rates for hip replacement patients – the quality indicator we use 
– were not available to patients nor insurers during the period we study. The Dutch Healthcare 
                                                            
4 The four largest companies account for 90 percent of the market. Market concentration by region is often even higher, which is due to the 
fact that these companies typically evolved from former regional sickness funds (Halbersma et al., 2010). 
5 The DTC system is more comprehensive than DRGs. It includes outpatient consultations and the remuneration of medical specialists. There 
were 29000 DTCs in the period we examine (2005-2007). 
6 This has been confirmed in interviews with representatives of insurers and hospitals involved in contract negotiations during the period we 
study. 
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Authority (NZa, 2009) found that hospital prices increased less in the free-pricing segment of 
DTCs than in the regulated segment between 2005 and 2008. Between 2006 and 2008 prices 
in the free-pricing segment even declined in real terms. There is no evidence that hospitals 
offset lower price increases by increasing service volume in the free-pricing segment 
(Krabbe-Alkemade et al., 2016; Schut & Van de Ven, 2011). Krabbe-Alkemade et al. (2016) 
found that the introduction of price competition led to lower total hospital costs.  
The effect of the introduction of price competition on hospital quality has not previously 
been estimated. A few studies look at the relationship between price and quality variation or 
between hospital concentration and quality after prices were liberalized. Heijink et al. (2013) 
find only limited variation in hospital quality and no relationship between contract prices and 
quality for cataract care. Croes et al. (2017) find a negative relationship between hospital 
market share and quality scores for two of the three diagnostic groups studied. Bijlsma et al. 
(2013) find that hospital concentration is associated with various process indicators, but both 
positive and negative relationships are found and there is no relationship between hospital 
concentration and any of a number of outcome indicators examined. None of these studies 
have a design capable of identifying a causal effect of competition on quality. 
IV. Data and measures 
A. Sources and sample 
We use comprehensive, hospital-level data from the National Medical Registry on patient 
discharges from all Dutch hospitals between 2001 and 2007. For each discharge, we observe 
the patient’s gender, age, zip code, primary/secondary/tertiary diagnoses (ICD-9CM), 
admission period, admission hospital and procedures. Procedures are classified according to a 
Dutch method based on (and for the procedures examined equivalent to) the International 
Classification of Procedures in Medicine (WHO-FIC, 2017). We restrict attention to patients 
discharged after a non-acute hip replacement (see below for details of the selection criteria). 
We construct a hospital-level panel which includes information on quality of care and patient 
case mix, and supplement this with an index of socio-economic status that is averaged over all 
the non-acute hip replacement patients of a hospital in a given year. This index is constructed 
by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research from the education, income and labor market 
status of residents of a zip code area (SCP, 2017).  
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In total, our panel consists of 89 hospitals observed from 2003 to 2007, yielding 445 
hospital-year observations. These hospitals admitted a total of 29,923 non-acute hip 
replacement patients per year, on average (SD: 1,525). 
B. Quality measures 
We use the unplanned 90-day readmission rate following non-acute hip replacement as our 
main quality indicator. This is preferred to the post hip replacement mortality rate because the 
latter was very low in the Netherlands in the period studied7. Higher (unplanned) readmission 
rates have been shown to be related to suboptimal quality of treatment both  generally (e.g. 
Rosen et al., 2013; Mokhtar et al., 2012) and following hip replacement (e.g. Clement et al., 
2013; Avram et al., 2014; Saucedo et al., 2014; Kurtz et al., 2016). Because planned 
readmissions (e.g. for a scheduled procedure) are not generally a signal of quality of care, we 
restrict attention to unplanned readmissions. All unplanned readmissions are attributed to the 
original treatment hospital. Unplanned readmissions following joint replacement are 
determined, in part, by the quality and safety of the initial hospital stay, transitional care 
services and post discharge support (Friebel et al., 2017). Widespread belief that readmissions 
are indicative of poor quality treatment is reflected in the fact that financial penalties for 
excess readmissions (including for hip replacements) have been imposed on hospitals in both 
the US and the UK since 2012 (Joynt & Jha, 2012). Consistent with this, in our data, four of 
the top five reasons (identified from diagnostic codes) for hip replacement patients to be 
readmitted within 90-days are related to complications, infections or inflammatory reactions 
due to prosthetic implants. There is no consensus on whether a 90-day or 30-day follow-up 
window to define orthopedic readmissions provides the better indicator of quality (Ramkumar 
et al., 2015). Since the two are highly correlated for hip replacements in our data (r(81)=.84, 
p<0.01 in 2003 and r(61)=.87, p<0.01 in 2007), it should make little difference which is used. 
As for 90-day readmissions, complications are the main reason to be readmitted within 30-
days. We examine robustness of the estimates to using 30-day readmissions. Information on 
hip replacement readmission rates is not in the public domain or available to health insurers in 
the Netherlands, and so this indicator is unlikely to have been subject to manipulation by 
hospitals.  
Sample inclusion and exclusion criteria were based on those defined in the technical 
specifications of the US Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Inpatient 
                                                            
7 Using the Causes of Death Register provided by Dutch Hospital Data and Statistics Netherlands, we calculate a within hospital mortality 
rate of 0.23 percent and a 30-day mortality rate of 0.29 percent following non-acute hip replacement in the period 2003-2007.   
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Quality Indicator #14 (AHRQ QI Version 5.0; IQI #14), which measures the hip replacement 
mortality rate. The population includes discharged patients aged 18 or older with any 
procedure code that indicates partial or full hip replacement and any diagnosis code that 
indicates osteoarthrosis of the pelvic region or thigh8. There were 79,140 such cases between 
2003 and 2007. To exclude acute cases, we drop those with any listed diagnosis codes 
indicating hip fracture and those with codes indicating pregnancy, childbirth or puerperium. 
We also exclude those who transfer to another hospital because it is impossible to determine 
whether readmission in such cases indicates sub-optimal quality of the treatment received in 
the first or the second hospital. Cases with missing information on discharge address, gender, 
age, year or principal diagnosis (n=405) are also dropped, as are patients who died in the 
hospital (n=183)9. After imposing all these exclusion restrictions, we are left with 70,273 
discharges following non-acute hip replacement between 2003 and 2007. Of these, 8.2 percent 
were readmitted to a hospital within 90 days for any reason that was not planned.  
C. Measures of hospital market structure 
We measure concentration at the hospital level using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
based on the number of hospital beds10: HHIh=∑ 𝑚௜ଶ
ே೓
௜ୀଵ , where 𝑚௜ is the percent market share 
of hospital i that lies within a fixed radius of hospital h and Nh is the total number of hospitals 
in that market. Some hospitals have multiple locations that do not all lie within the same 
market defined by distance11. Online Appendix 2 explains how we calculate the HHI in these 
cases. For our baseline analysis, we use a 30 kilometers (by road) fixed radius because 
patients travel, on average, for 20 minutes to get to the hospital of their choice (Beukers et al., 
2014; Varkevisser et al., 2012; Varkevisser et al., 2010) and most Dutch hospitals provide hip 
replacements (Roos et al., 2017). But since variation around the mean travel time is high 
(Beukers et al., 2014; Varkevisser et al., 2012; Varkevisser et al., 2010), we examine 
sensitivity to fixing the radius at 20, 40 and 50 kilometers to define the market. Because 
providers are anonymized in the data to protect confidentiality, we cannot use the continuous 
measure of HHI once the hospital data are linked with patient-level data. The HHI of each 
hospital was therefore constructed in a database not containing patient-level data. Next, an 
indicator of whether the HHI is under 2500 was derived and this was then linked to the 
                                                            
8 See Online Appendix 1 for the relevant procedure codes and ICD-9CM diagnosis codes. 
9 Given the very low within hospital mortality rate following non-acute hip replacement, any selection bias arising from excluding those who 
die is likely to have a negligible impact on the estimates (Fischer et al., 2014; Laudicella et al., 2013).  
10 The information on the number of beds per hospital location per year was assembled using several datasets that are/were partly publically 
available (Bartels, 2001; 2002; Prismant, 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; CIBG, 2008; 2009; CBS, 2010; RIVM, 2006; 2008; 2009).  
11 Of the 103 hospitals, 5 had more than one location within the period that we study.  
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patient-level dataset using the hospital identifier by Statistics Netherlands. Choice of the 2500 
threshold is based on the convention in antitrust regulation that considers hospitals with an 
HHI at or above that value to be part of a highly concentrated market (e.g. FTC merger 
guidelines, 2010). It is assumed that these hospitals would be exposed to less price 
competition after 2005 when free negotiation of prices was allowed for hip replacements than 
hospitals operating in less concentrated markets.  
V. Empirical strategy 
We identify the effect of price competition on quality by comparing the change after price 
liberalization in hip replacement readmission rates of hospitals operating in less concentrated 
markets with the before-and-after difference in the readmission rates of hospitals in highly 
concentrated markets. Hospitals with an HHI below 2500 form our treatment group, while 
those with a HHI of at least 2500 belong to the comparison group. Comparing changes in hip 
replacement readmission rates of these two groups does not identify the impact of introducing 
price competition per se, but identifies the effect of greater exposure to price competition 
provided the two groups would have followed parallel trends in readmission rates if price 
setting had not been liberalized.  
Only hospitals with a HHI either always below 2500 or always above 2500 during the 
period of analysis are used. Hence, no hospital can switch from the treatment group to the 
comparison group or vice versa, and the composition of each group is held constant by 
construction. Sixteen hospitals out of a total of 103 are excluded because they fail to meet this 
criterion. This is mainly because of merger activity12. 
To avoid contamination from earlier and later policy changes13, we focus on a relatively 
narrow time window around the implementation of price liberalization. We use data from 
2003 and 2004 to capture the period before price liberalization and data from 2006 and 2007 
for the post-reform period. We exclude data from 2005 as the policy was implemented on 
February 1 of that year.  
We estimate the following fixed effects model by least squares: 
𝑅𝑅௛௧ = 𝛼 + 𝛿 1(𝐻𝐻𝐼௛ < 2500) × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇௧ + 𝑿௛௧𝝁 + 𝑢௛ + 𝜆௧ + 𝜀௛௧                                 (1)  
 
                                                            
12 Two other hospitals had to be excluded because the number of hip replacement cases was too low in the post-reform period. 
13 In 2008, the Health Care Inspectorate set up a program to develop reliable, comparable and valid quality information, free pricing 
negotiations were extended to about 20 per cent of hospitals’ revenues, specialists’ payments changed and entry to the hospital market 
became easier because of the abolishment of government approval over hospital construction. All of these changes potentially affect the 
relationship between market concentration and quality of care. Hence, we are limited to using data until 2007 to examine the impact of price 
liberalization for hip replacements introduced in 2005. 
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where RRht is the unplanned 90-day readmission rate (percent) for non-acute hip replacements 
at hospital h in year t, 1() is the indicator function, POSTt is a binary indicator equal to 1 for 
the post-reform period (2006 & 2007), Xht is a vector of hospital characteristics that vary over 
time but are plausibly not affected by the introduction of price liberalization, uh is a hospital 
fixed effect, λt is a year effect and εht is a random error term.The covariates consist of the 
Charlson index of comorbidity (Quan et al., 2011; 2005) averaged over a hospital’s non-acute 
hip replacement patients in a year, the percentage of these patients aged 65+, 40-60 and 18-39 
years, the percentage female, the percentage discharged to a skilled nursing facility14, and the 
mean zip code-specific socioeconomic score of the patients. These indicators of case mix are 
included to increase efficiency and to allow for any change in the composition of hip 
replacement patients that differs between hospitals in less and more concentration markets 
without being caused by the differential effect of price liberalization. We argue at the end of 
this section that there is little or no reason to expect the reform to have caused hip 
replacement patients to select different hospitals or hospitals to have selected different 
patients. 
Table 1 presents means of the covariates before and after the reform for the treatment and 
comparison groups. Prior to the reform, there are some significant differences in the 
characteristics of the patients across the two groups. But the differences are rather small. 
Significance reflects the large sample size. The treatment group has a slightly higher 
proportion of females, its patients are older by about 1 year and they have higher 
socioeconomic status and propensity to be admitted to a skilled nursing facility after 
discharge, on average. There are no pre-reform differences in comorbidity measured by the 
Charlson. The characteristics of the patients change relatively little between the two periods 
for both groups. None of the difference-in-differences of these characteristics are significantly 
different from zero, indicating that there was no differential change in the composition of the 
groups with respect to these observables. 
If in the absence of price liberalization in 2005 the average readmission rate of hospitals in 
less concentrated markets would have changed in 2006-07 by as much as the change that 
actually occurred in the hospitals operating in the more concentrated markets, then the 
                                                            
14 Our dataset indicates whether the patient went home, to another general hospital, to another academic hospital, to a nursing home or to 
another healthcare organization after discharge. According to a recent (and unpublished) study by Statistics Netherlands, the majority of 
patients that is included in the ‘another healthcare organization’ category is transferred to a nursing home facility (approximately 70 percent). 
In this paper, we assigned every patient that is included in the ‘nursing home’ and ‘other healthcare organization’ categories to a ‘transferred 
to a skilled nursing home facility’ variable. This measure is obviously not entirely correct but given that we are not able to distinguish 
specific organizations within the ‘another healthcare organization’ group, this was the best we could do.  
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parameter δ in (1) corresponds to the average effect of the increased exposure to price 
competition on the readmission rate among the hospitals in the less concentrated markets. 
TABLE 1 — MEANS OF COVARIATES BY PERIOD AND TREATMENT GROUP 
Patients’ characteristics  Treatment group 
(HHI < 2500) 
 
Comparison group 
(HHI > 2500) 
 
Difference (-in-
differences) 
     
Proportion female Pre-reform  (2003-04) 0.72  
[0.05] 
0.69 
[0.05] 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Post-reform  (2006-07) 0.69 
[0.06] 
0.67 
[0.06] 
 
Change  0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
     
Mean age Pre-reform  (2003-04) 70.97 
 [2.42] 
69.96 
[2.22] 
1.01*** 
(0.37) 
Post-reform  (2006-07) 70.98 
[2.69] 
70.26 
[1.84] 
 
Change  -0.01 
(0.45) 
-0.31 
(0.35) 
-0.29  
(0.57) 
     
Mean socioeconomic  
score  
Pre-reform  (2003-04) 7.46 
[0.48] 
6.88 
[0.52] 
0.58*** 
(0.08) 
Post-reform  (2006-07) 7.48 
[0.49] 
6.92 
[0.55] 
 
Change  -0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
-0.03  
(0.12) 
     
Mean Charlson Score 
(comorbidity) 
Pre-reform  (2003-04) 0.0024 
[0.0089] 
0.0015 
[0.0045] 
0.0009 
(0.0011) 
Post-reform  (2006-07) 0.0018 
[0.0048] 
0.0008 
[0.0022] 
 
Change  0.0006 
(0.0012) 
0.0007 
(0.0006) 
0.00  
(0.00) 
     
Proportion discharged to 
skilled nursing facility 
Pre-reform  (2003-04) 0.08 
[0.10] 
0.05 
[0.06] 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
Post-reform  (2006-07) 0.08 
[0.13] 
0.05 
[0.01] 
 
Change  -0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00  
(0.02) 
      
Number of hospitals  72  72 72 
Number of patients  25,197  30,281 55,478 
Notes: Pre-/post-reform cell entries are obtained by first computing the mean across all non-acute hip replacement patients discharged from 
each hospital and then taking the simple average of these means across all hospitals within a group and period. Figures in square brackets are 
standard deviations across hospitals. Figures in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated change in the mean. Hospitals and patients 
are selected using the criteria described in section IVB. The socioeconomic score is increasing in socioeconomic status and ranges from 0 to 
10. The Charlson score (Quan et al. 2011) ranges from 0 to 9, with higher being more severe.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Figure 1 supports the plausibility of the common trends identification assumption. Even 
going back to 2001, two years before the start of the pre-reform period that we use for 
identification of the effect, the trend in the readmission rate, and indeed its level, prior to the 
2005 reform is very similar for hospitals operating in more and less concentrated markets. 
Estimation of a model similar to (1) using data from 2001 to 2004 and allowing the year 
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effects to differ between hospitals located in more and less concentrated markets reveals no 
evidence of differential trends in the period immediately preceding the reform (Online 
Appendix 3; table 1; column (i)).  
A gap opens up in the readmission rates in 2006 immediately after the liberalization of price 
setting (Figure 1). The readmission rate falls in the less concentrated markets but not in the 
more concentrated markets. If the common trends assumption holds, this would suggest that 
hospitals that were more exposed to price competition raised the quality of the care they 
delivered. However, the divergence is not sustained. In 2007, the readmission rate rises again 
in less concentrated markets, while remaining constant for hospitals largely shielded from 
competitive pressures. Over the two-year post-reform period, the graph suggests that price 
liberalization did not consistently lower or raise the quality of hip replacements. Motivated by 
the figure and because hospitals and insurers may not have fully adjusted to the new 
contracting conditions immediately after prices became freely negotiable, we estimate a 
second model that allows the treatment effect to differ in the two post-reform years:  
𝑅𝑅௛௧ = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛿௞௞ୀ଺,଻ 1(𝐻𝐻𝐼௛ < 2500) × 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅0𝑘௧ + 𝑿௛௧𝝁 + 𝑢௛ + 𝜆௧ + 𝜀௛௧                                 (2)  
where YEAR06t=1 (YEAR07t=1) if the year is 2006 (2007). Under the same common trends 
assumption, δ6 gives the average effect of increased exposure to price competition in 2006 
and δ7 gives the equivalent effect in 2007. 
Market concentration is generally considered to be potentially endogenous because 
performance may feed back into structure and unobservable attributes may influence both 
quality and patients’ choice of hospital (Evans et al., 1993). In this study, both the empirical 
strategy and the institutional context eliminate or, at least greatly minimize, the threat to 
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FIGURE 1. 90-DAY READMISSION RATE AFTER HIP REPLACEMENT PER YEAR & PER
HHI GROUP (RADIUS 30 KM)
HHI below 2500 (treatment group)
HHI above 2500 (comparison
group)
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identification from endogeneities of both types. Hospital fixed effects deal with any time 
invariant correlated unobservables. Further, we avoid using any time varying information on 
market concentration. Each hospital is categorized into one of two groups according to 
whether its HHI starts and remains either below 2500 or above 2500. Since barely any quality 
information was available around the time of the reform, it is unlikely that any change in 
quality would affect patient flows. But even if there was a feedback from quality to market 
concentration, any such endogenously induced variation in the HHI is not used in the 
estimation, and so cannot cause bias. Hospitals that cross the HHI threshold of 2500, possibly 
arising from a change in performance that either attracts or deters patients, are dropped from 
the sample. Quality-induced changes in market concentration of this magnitude, if they exist, 
are also not used in the estimation. Since we do not identify from time variation in HHI, there 
would be no advantage from calculating the HHI on the basis of predicted, rather than actual, 
patient flows, as some others have done (Kessler & McClellan, 2000; Cooper et al., 2011; 
Gaynor et al., 2013).  
We deliberately choose an elective procedure to measure quality in order to obtain 
evidence on the effect of competition on a treatment that is likely to exhibit much greater 
demand elasticity with respect to quality than is the case with acute treatments (e.g. for AMI), 
the demand for which is likely dominated by proximity. Hitherto, the literature has made the 
opposite choice (see e.g. Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2013). Lack of direct relevance of 
competition to the acute procedure used to measure quality has been accepted in order to 
obtain a measure that is less vulnerable to endogeneity arising from patient selection of the 
provider. There are three reasons why our study is less vulnerable to this selection bias. First, 
we eliminate correlated, time invariant unobservable differences in patient composition across 
hospitals with fixed effects. Only if the reform were to change unobservable patient 
characteristics differentially across the treatment and comparison groups would there be any 
potential bias. Second, as previously mentioned, patients and insurers lacked information on 
hospital quality, including readmission rates for hip replacements, before and after the reform. 
There was limited scope for selection on quality. Third, in contrast to the UK healthcare 
market reforms that have been the subject of many previous studies15, price liberalization in 
the Netherlands did not change opportunities for patient choice. Patients and health insurers 
had free choice of provider before and after the reform. In addition to these conceptual 
                                                            
15 These studies either use rich data or intruments to deal with time varying patient selection. Skellern (2017) controls for risk-adjusted 
Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs), while Gaynor et al. (2013); Cooper et al. (2011) and Moscelli et al. (2016) instrument 
hospital choice using GP/patient-hospital distances. Cooper et al. (2011) do not reject exogeneity of market structure and Moscelli et al. 
(2016) find that instrumenting has very little impact on the estimates, relative to controlling for a rich set of patient covariates. 
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arguments, the comparisons of patient characteristics in Table 1 give empirical grounds to 
believe that identification is unlikely to be invalidated by endogenous patient selection. None 
of the observable indicators of case mix changed differently in the treatment group than in the 
comparison group. In fact, there was very little change at all in these characteristics. If 
observables changed little and, if at all, comparably, there is little reason to believe that 
unobservables changed markedly differentially across the groups. 
Hospital initiated selection of patients is potentially of greater concern in the context of this 
study. Price liberalization could potentially give hospitals operating in competitive markets 
the incentive to drive down costs and simultaneously cherry pick more straightforward cases 
so that tighter budgets would not impinge on quality. However, because we identify from 
comparison across hospitals categorized by broad ranges of HHI, any cherry picking could 
bias our results only if it resulted in patients being shunted long distances. More likely is that 
a hospital would refer a patient who is at greater risk of readmission to a neighboring hospital, 
which is likely to be in the same treatment or comparison group. So, while the case mix of 
individual hospitals may change due to patient selection in response to the reform, it is rather 
unlikely that this would change the composition of the groups. The comparisons of observable 
patient characteristics given in Table 1 again support this.   
VI. Results 
A. Main estimates 
Prior to the reform, there was no significant difference in either the 90-day or the 30-day 
readmission rate between the treatment (high competitive pressure) group and the comparison 
(low competitive pressure) group (Table 2). Post reform, the readmission rate remained 
constant in the treatment group and increased (10% significance) in the comparison group. 
Consequently, the simple difference-in-differences is negative, which would indicate that 
increased competition led to lower readmission rates (i.e. higher clinical quality), but it is not 
significantly different from zero. 
The conditional difference-in-differences (DID) estimate given in the first column of the 
top panel of Table 3 is essentially the same as the simple DID estimate in magnitude and lack 
of significance. The similarity provides a further indication that there is likely to be little bias 
from correlated time varying unobservables. These results suggest there was no effect of 
greater exposure to price competition on 90-day readmission rates. Consistent with what was 
observed in Figure 1, the conditional DID estimates in the first column of the second panel of 
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Table 3 suggest that increased price competition reduced the 90-day readmission rate by 1 
percentage point in the first year (2006) after the reform but had no effect in the second year 
(2007). As is apparent from Figure 1, the significant effect in 2006 is driven by a fall in the 
readmission rate of the hospitals exposed most to competition while the readmission rate of 
hospitals that are dominant in their markets did not change.  
TABLE 2 — UNPLANNED 90-DAY AND 30-DAY HIP REPLACEMENT READMISSION RATES BY PERIOD AND TREATMENT GROUP 
Outcome  Treatment group 
(HHI < 2500) 
(1) 
Comparison group 
(HHI > 2500) 
(2) 
Difference (-in-
difference) 
(1)-(2) 
     
90-day readmission rate  Pre-reform  0.0825  
(0.0037) 
0.0788  
(0.0027) 
0.0037 
(0.0045) 
Post-reform  0.0814 
(0.0041) 
0.0855 
(0.0032) 
 
Change (Post – Pre)   -0.0011 
(0.0055) 
0.0067 
(0.0042) 
-0.0077 
(0.0069) 
     
30-day readmission rate  Pre-reform 0.0480 
(0.0027) 
0.0434 
(0.0020) 
0.0046 
(0.0034) 
Post-reform  0.0492 
(0.0031) 
0.0486 
(0.0022) 
 
Change (Post – Pre)  0.0012 
(0.0041) 
0.0052* 
(0.0030) 
-0.0040 
(0.0051) 
      
Number of hospitals   36 36 72 
Number of patients   25,197 30,281 55,478 
      
Notes: Table gives the simple mean readmission rate averaged over all hospitals in the treatment (HHI<2500) group and the comparison 
(HHI>2500) group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Hospitals and patients selected by criteria described in section IVB. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
B. Robustness 
Market definition 
The main estimates are generated on the basis of HHIs calculated with a radius of 30km used 
to define the boundary of the market around a hospital. To check robustness, we recalculate 
the HHI using a radius of 20, 40 and 50km to define a market, recategorize hospitals into the 
treatment and comparisons groups on the basis of the revised index and then re-estimate 
models (1) and (2) in each case. Estimates are given in the appropriately labelled columns of 
Table 3. With a radius of 30km, hospitals are evenly split between the treatment and 
comparison groups. As the radius is widened, more hospitals get put into the treatment group 
because the HHI decreases as the area that defines the market increases.  
Irrespective of the radius used, the treatment effect averaged over the two years of the post-
reform period is insignificant. When the radius is increased, the year specific estimates 
obtained from model (2) continue to indicate that exposure to more intensive price 
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competition significantly reduced the readmission rate by a similar magnitude in 2006. When 
the radius is reduced, the estimate of this effect falls in magnitude and loses significance. This 
may be because more hospitals are then in the comparison group. At least some of the 
hospitals that have a HHI below 2500 using a 30km radius but above 2500 with a radius of 
20km may, in reality, be exposed to competitive pressure and so respond to the price 
liberalization similarly to those that remain in the treatment group irrespective of the radius 
used. This will reduce the DID between the groups. There is no significant effect in 2007 
irrespective of the geographic radius used to define the market. In general, irrespective of the 
radius used to define a hospital market, there is no clear evidence that increased price 
competition consistently impacted on the readmission rate. 
TABLE 3 — ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF PRICE COMPETITION ON READMISSION RATES AFTER HIP REPLACEMENT 
 90-day readmission 
(radius 30) 
90-day readmission 
(radius 20) 
90-day readmission 
(radius 40) 
90-day readmission 
(radius 50) 
30-day readmission 
(radius 30) 
Model (1)      
𝛿መ -0.0095 
(0.0066) 
-0.0041 
(0.0067) 
-0.0094 
(0.0061) 
-0.0084 
(0.0075) 
-0.0042 
(0.0048) 
      
                 R2 0.55 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.55 
Model (2)      
               𝛿መ଺(2006) -0.0189** 
(0.0074) 
-0.0114 
(0.0079) 
-0.0170** 
(0.0076) 
-0.0179** 
(0.0091) 
-0.0084 
(0.0056) 
              𝛿መ଻ (2007) -0.0000 
(0.0082) 
0.0040 
(0.0083) 
-0.0011 
(0.0071) 
0.0024 
(0.0085) 
0.0001 
(0.0059) 
      
                R2 0.56 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.55 
      
N treatment hospitals 36 19 44 52 36 
N comparison 
hospitals 
36 44 20 12 36 
N hospitals×years 287 247 249 245 287 
N patients 55,478 46,823 45,472 46,696 55,478 
N readmitted patients 5,706 4,788 4,705 4,787 1,290 
      
Notes: Top panel gives OLS estimates of δ from regression (1). Second panel gives OLS estimates of δ6 and δ7 from regression (2). All 
estimates obtained from regressions containing hospital and year fixed effects and covariates identified in Table 1. Full estimates in Online 
Appendix 3; Tables A2 and A3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Hospitals and patients selected by criteria described in section IVB. 
Radius X indicates that the estimates are based on treatment/comparison groups formed on the basis of a HHI calculated with a radius of X km 
defining the boundary of a market. The sample size falls as the radius is reduced because more hospitals cross the HHI threshold of 2500 used 
to define the treatment/comparison groups during the estimation period. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level.* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
30-day readmission rate 
Since arguments and evidence supporting the 90-day readmission rate as a better indicator of 
quality of care than the 30-day rate are lacking, we check robustness to using the shorter 
period. Pre-reform trends in 30-day readmission rates are reasonably parallel between the 
treatment and comparison groups, although there is a slight dip for the comparison group only 
in 2003 (see Figure 2). The hypothesis that year effects in the 30-day readmission rate are 
equal for the treatment and comparison group hospitals in the pre-treatment period is not 
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rejected (Online Appendix 3, table A1; column (ii)), which lends plausibility to the parallel 
trends identification assumption for this outcome also.   
The final column of Table 3 reveals that estimated effects on the 30-day readmission rate 
are generally smaller in magnitude than those on the 90-day rate. Over the full post-reform 
period, there continues to be no evidence that exposure to increased price competition 
consistently affected quality of care.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
This is the first paper to credibly identify the effect of price competition on the quality of 
elective healthcare. When producers are free to compete on both price and quality, demand is 
potentially sensitive to both. However, when information on the latter is lacking or poor, 
organizations may increase profits by cutting both price and quality. This logic is one of the 
reasons why regulators have been leery of permitting price competition in healthcare markets. 
But in most countries, including the Netherlands, hospitals are not-for-profit organizations 
that may not be prepared to grasp a competitive advantage obtainable by cutting prices if this 
requires skimping on quality. Our findings are consistent with this behavior, although they 
certainly do not confirm it. Freedom to negotiate prices for a number of elective procedures 
did not result in lower quality care measured by readmission rates after hip replacements in 
the hospitals in the most competitive markets.  
In the absence of meaningful quality information, even in a market dominated by not-for-
profit organizations, one would expect contract negotiations between insurers and hospitals to 
focus on price. This focus may result in a (unintended) deterioration of quality. We find that 
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FIGURE 2. 30-DAY READMISSION RATE AFTER HIP REPLACEMENT PER YEAR & PER
HHI GROUP (RADIUS 30 KM)
HHI below 2500 (treatment group)
HHI above 2500 (comparison
group)
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exposure to increased price competition initially had a positive impact on quality. The hip 
replacement readmission rate fell in the most competitive hospital markets in the first year in 
which prices were liberalized. This may result from one side of the market’s (hospital 
administrators’) initial misapprehension of how the other side (insurers) would behave in the 
new contacting arrangements. For the first time, hospitals and insurers were negotiating 
contracts for hospital products (DRG equivalents) rather than agreeing on prospective budgets 
and related parameters, like hospital days. Hospitals may have understood that the insurers 
would be sensitive to both price and the quality of the products. Hospitals in more competitive 
markets might have been afraid that they would lose out if they did not improve their quality, 
as well as keeping prices down. When hospitals came to realize that bargaining primarily 
focused on price and not on quality, they may have decided to scale down initial quality 
improvement efforts. Of course, this is no more than supposition. It would have been 
interesting to extend the post-reform period of analysis to check whether, over time, a 
negative impact on quality did emerge. Unfortunately, this is not possible because of later 
reforms of the healthcare market that would confound identification of the effect of the 2005 
reform (see footnote 13). 
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Online Appendices 
Appendix 1  
Dutch Classification of Procedures in Medicine procedure codes that indicate partial or full 
hip replacement:  
58150; 58160; 58161; 58162; 58163; 58164; 581520; 581523; 581521; 581522; 581524; 
581525; 581651. 
 
ICD-9CM diagnosis codes that indicate osteoarthrosis of the pelvic region or thigh:  
71500; 71509; 71510; 71518; 71520; 71525; 71528; 71530; 71535; 71538; 71580; 71589; 
71590; 71595; 71598; 71650; 71655; 71658; 71659; 71660; 71665; 71668; 71690; 71695; 
71698; 71699. 
 
ICD-9CM diagnosis codes that indicate hip fractures:  
82000; 82001; 82002; 82003; 82009; 82010; 82011; 82012; 82013; 82019; 82020; 82021; 
82022; 82030; 82031; 82032; 8202; 8209 
 
ICD-9CM diagnosis codes that indicate pregnancy, childbirth and puerperium:  
630; 631; 632; 6331; 6339; 634; 635; 636; 637; 638; 639; 640; 6400; 64003; 641; 6410; 6411; 
6412; 6419; 642; 6420; 6431; 6439; 644; 6441; 6442; 645; 6451; 6452; 646; 6460; 6461; 
6462; 6463; 6464; 6465; 6466; 6467; 647; 6470; 6471; 6472; 6473; 6474; 6475; 6476; 648; 
6480; 6481; 6482; 6483; 6484; 6485; 6486; 6487; 6488; 64883; 6489; 649; 6490; 6491; 6492; 
6493; 6494; 6495; 6496; 6497; 650; 651; 6510; 6511; 652; 653; 654; 655; 65573; 656; 6560; 
65611; 65631; 65653; 65661; 657; 658; 6580; 65803; 6581; 6588; 659; 6591; 6598; 660; 
66001; 66011; 66041; 66061; 661; 6611; 6610; 6613; 662; 6621; 663; 6631; 6633; 664; 
66404; 66414; 66434; 665; 6653; 666; 66604; 66614; 667; 668; 66951; 66970; 6699; 670; 
67004; 671; 67144; 672; 673; 674; 675; 67514; 67594; 676; 67624; 678; 6780; 6781; 67902 
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Appendix 2  
In the Netherlands, some hospitals have multiple locations. We improve on previous research 
by using the hospital site-specific locations rather than the hospital’s main location. Because 
not all treatment locations are within the same market if defined by the kilometers range, we 
can distinguish five different scenarios: (i) Hospital A has only one location; (ii) Hospital A1 
has another treatment location (hospital A2) that lies within hospital A1’s radius; (iii) Hospital 
A1 has another treatment location (hospital A2) that does not lie within hospital A1’s radius; 
(iv) The competitor of hospital A (hospital B1) has multiple treatment locations (hospital B2) 
that do not lie within hospital A’s radius and (v) The competitor of hospital A (hospital B1) 
has multiple treatment locations (hospital B2) that lie within hospital A’s radius. Example 
calculations of the HHI in each scenario are given below.  
 
 
SCENARIO I: HHI FOR HOSPITAL A WITH ONE LOCATION USING 30 
KILOMETER RADIUS 
Hospital # of beds mh mh2 HHI 
A 
B 
100 
200 
33.33 
66.67 
1111.11 
4444.44 
 
 
Total 300 100.00 5555.56 5555.56 
Notes: mh is calculated by dividing the number of beds per hospital by 
the total number of beds in the market.  
 
 
 
 
SCENARIO II: HHI FOR HOSPITAL A WITH TWO LOCATIONS USING 30 
KILOMETER RADIUS 
Hospital # of beds mh mh2 HHI 
A1 100    
A2 50    
A 150 17.65 311.42  
B 200 23.53 553.63  
C 200 23.53 553.63  
D 300 35.29 1245.67  
Total 850 100.00 2664.35 2664.35 
Notes: mh is calculated by dividing the number of beds per hospital by 
the total number of beds in the market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A2 30km 
D 
 
C 
30km 
A 
 
B 
30km A1 
B 
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SCENARIO III: HHI FOR HOPSITAL A WITH TWO LOCATIONS (ONE NOT WITHIN 
THE OTHER’S RADIUS) USING 30 KILOMETER RADIUS 
Hospital # of beds mh mh2 HHI 
A1 100 33.33 1111.11  
B 200 66.67 4444.44  
Total 300 100.00 5555.56 5555.56 
Notes: mh is calculated by dividing the number of beds per hospital by 
the total number of beds in the market.  
 
 
 
 
 
SCENARIO IV: HHI FOR HOSPITAL A USING 30 KILOMETER RADIUS. 
COMPETITOR (HOSPITAL B) HAS TWO LOCATIONS WHICH ARE NOT BOTH 
WITHIN HOSPITAL A’S RADIUS 
Hospital # of beds mh mh2 HHI 
A 100 33.33 1111.11  
B1 200 66.67 4444.44  
Total 300 100.00 5555.56 5555.56 
Notes: mh is calculated by dividing the number of beds per hospital by 
the total number of beds in the market.  
 
 
 
 
 
SCENARIO V: HHI FOR HOSPITAL A USING 30 KILOMETER 
RADIUS.COMPETITOR (HOSPITAL B) HAS TWO LOCATIONS WHICH ARE BOTH 
WITHIN HOSPITAL A’S RADIUS 
Hospital # of beds mh mh2 HHI 
A 100 25 625  
B1 200    
B2 100    
B 300 75 5625  
Total 400 100.00 6250 6250 
Notes: mh is calculated by dividing the number of beds per hospital by 
the total number of beds in the market.  
 
 
 
  
30km 
30km 
A1 
A2 
B 
C 
 
B2 
30km A 
B2 
B1 
 
A 
 
B1 
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Appendix 3 
TABLE A1 — ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF PRICE COMPETITION ON READMISSION RATES AFTER HIP REPLACEMENT (PRE-REFORM PERIOD) 
Radius 90-day readmission rates after hip 
replacement (radius 30) 
30-day readmission rates after hip 
replacement (radius 30) 
   
YEAR01 -0.0073 
(0.0050) 
-0.0053 
(0.0042) 
YEAR02  0.0004 
(0.0055) 
0.0043 
(0.0044) 
YEAR03 -0.0004 
(0.0050) 
-0.0007 
(0.0038) 
YEAR04 (reference category) - - 
𝛿መଵ (2001) -0.0027 
(0.0084) 
-0.0025 
(0.0069) 
𝛿መଶ (2002) -0.0110 
(0.0084) 
-0.0087 
(0.0068) 
𝛿መଷ (2003) -0.0060 
(0.0084) 
-0.0029 
(0.0065) 
Proportion female 0.0241 
(0.0526) 
-0.0470 
(0.0356) 
Proportion age category 18-39 (reference category) - - 
Proportion age category 40-64 -0.0484 
(0.1461) 
-0.0560 
(0.1142) 
Proportion age category 65 and older -0.0804 
(0.1389) 
-0.0603 
(0.1076) 
Proportion SES score 0-5 (reference category) - - 
Proportion SES score 6-8 0.0334 
(0.0571) 
0.0335 
(0.0497) 
Proportion SES score 8-10 0.0548 
(0.1075) 
0.0285 
(0.0815) 
Proportion discharged to skilled nursing facility 0.0827 
(0.0412) 
0.0691 
(0.0300) 
(intercept) 0.0984 
(0.1411) 
0.1045 
(0.1122) 
   
N treatment hospitals 41 41 
N comparison hospitals 40 40 
N hospitals×years 323 323 
N patients 57,648 57,648 
N readmitted patients 4,380 2,483 
   
R2 0.63 0.60 
   
Notes: OLS estimates of 𝛿መଵ, 𝛿መଶ and 𝛿መଷ (pretreatment years) containing hospital and year fixed effects and covariates. All estimates from 
regressions containing hospital and year fixed effects and covariates identified in Table 1. Charlson Score not included in this analysis as our 
dataset does not include information on comorbidities before 2001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Hospitals and patients selected by 
criteria described in section IVB. H0: β4=β5=β6=0 (F3,212=0.62; p-value>0.6035 for the 90-day readmission rates and F3,212=0.62; p-
value>0.6007 for the 30-day readmission rates) 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE A2 — ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF PRICE COMPETITION ON READMISSION RATES AFTER HIP REPLACEMENT 
Radius 90-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 30) 
90-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 20) 
90-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 40) 
90-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 50) 
30-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 30) 
      
YEAR03  -0.0043 
(0.0038) 
-0.0053 
(0.0044) 
-0.0056 
(0.0046) 
-0.0054 
(0.0046) 
-0.0032 
(0.0031) 
YEAR04 (reference category) - - - - - 
YEAR06 0.0050 
(0.0048) 
0.0014 
(0.0048) 
0.0063 
(0.0055) 
0.0059 
(0.0072) 
0.0034 
(0.0035) 
YEAR07 0.0041 
(0.0048) 
0.0047 
(0.0050) 
0.0098* 
(0.0054) 
0.0105 
(0.0073) 
0.0009 
(0.0034) 
𝛿 -0.0095 
(0.0066) 
-0.0041 
(0.0067) 
-0.0094 
(0.0061) 
-0.0084 
(0.0075) 
-0.0042 
(0.0048) 
Proportion female -0.0579 
(0.0466) 
-0.0200 
(0.0468) 
-0.0193 
(0.0468) 
-0.0170 
(0.0480) 
-0.0571* 
(0.0292) 
Proportion age category 18-39 
(reference category) 
- - - - - 
Proportion age category 40-64 -0.2404 
(0.2159) 
-0.3268* 
(0.1940)* 
-0.1690 
(0.1965) 
-0.1805 
(0.2014) 
-0.2715 
(0.1679) 
Proportion age category 65 and older -0.2397 
(0.2238) 
-0.3346 
(0.2013) 
-0.1730 
(0.2031) 
-0.1911 
(0.2097) 
-0.2433 
(0.1725) 
Proportion SES score 0-5 (reference 
category) 
- - - - - 
Proportion SES score 6-8 -0.0440 
(0.0887) 
-0.0684 
(0.0692) 
-0.0662 
(0.0714) 
-0.0485 
(0.0754) 
-0.0579 
(0.0644) 
Proportion SES score 8-10 0.0529 
(0.1271) 
0.0661 
(0.1112) 
0.0563 
(0.1143) 
0.0682 
(0.1181) 
0.0244 
(0.0963) 
Charlson Score -0.3242 
(0.5515) 
-0.0292 
(0.4085) 
0.1794 
(0.4603) 
0.1103 
(0.4758) 
-0.7032** 
(0.3197) 
Proportion discharged to skilled 
nursing facility 
-0.0113 
(0.0327) 
-0.0262 
(0.0315) 
-0.0333 
(0.0307) 
-0.0272 
(0.0319) 
0.0133 
(0.0203) 
(intercept) 0.3943 
(0.2395) 
0.4809** 
(0.2062) 
0.3209 
(0.2095) 
-0.3198 
(0.2179) 
0.3826** 
(0.1878) 
      
N treatment hospitals 36 19 44 52 36 
N comparison hospitals 36 44 20 12 36 
N hospitals×years 287 247 249 245 287 
N patients 55,478 46,823 45,472 46,696 55,478 
N readmitted patients 5,706 4,788 4,705 4,787 1,290 
      
R2 0.55 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.55 
      
Notes: OLS estimates of δ from regression (1). All estimates from regressions containing hospital and year fixed effects and covariates 
identified in Table 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Hospitals and patients selected by criteria described in section IVB. Radius X 
indicates that the estimates are based on treatment/comparison groups formed on the basis of a HHI calculated with a radius of X km 
defining the boundary of a market.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE A3 — ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF PRICE COMPETITION ON READMISSION RATES AFTER HIP REPLACEMENT (POST-REFORM PERIOD DIFFERENTIATED) 
Radius 90-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 30) 
90-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 20) 
90-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 40) 
90-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 50) 
30-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 30) 
      
YEAR03  -0.0042 
(0.0038) 
-0.0052 
(0.0044) 
-0.0055 
(0.0046) 
-0.0053 
(0.0047) 
-0.0032 
(0.0031) 
YEAR04 (reference category) - - - - - 
YEAR06 0.0096* 
(0.0051) 
0.0036 
(0.0050) 
0.0115* 
(0.0063) 
0.0138* 
(0.0083) 
0.0055 
(0.0037) 
YEAR07 -0.0005 
(0.0049) 
0.0025 
(0.0051) 
0.0043 
(0.0054) 
0.0022 
(0.0076) 
-0.0019 
(0.0035) 
𝛿መଵ (2006) -0.0189** 
(0.0074) 
-0.0114 
(0.0079) 
-0.0170** 
(0.0076) 
-0.0179** 
(0.0091) 
-0.0084 
(0.0056) 
𝛿መଶ (2007) -0.0000 
(0.0082) 
0.0040 
(0.0083) 
-0.0011 
(0.0071) 
0.0024 
(0.0085) 
0.0001 
(0.0059) 
Proportion female -0.0607 
(0.0457) 
-0.0192 
(0.0459) 
-0.0197 
(0.0459) 
-0.0099 
(0.0471) 
-0.0584** 
(0.0289) 
Proportion age category 18-39 
(reference category) 
- - - - - 
Proportion age category 40-64 -0.2309 
(0.2122) 
-0.3059* 
(0.1827) 
-0.1601 
(0.1958) 
-0.1641 
(0.2004) 
-0.2672 
(0.1678) 
Proportion age category 65 and older -0.2266 
(0.2195) 
-0.3179* 
(0.1897) 
-0.1618 
(0.2020) 
-0.1771 
(0.2085) 
-0.2374 
(0.1719) 
Proportion SES score 0-5 (reference 
category) 
- - - - - 
Proportion SES score 6-8 -0.0349 
(0.0905) 
-0.0672 
(0.0668) 
-0.0593 
(0.0722) 
-0.0323 
(0.0773) 
-0.0538 
(0.0644) 
Proportion SES score 8-10 0.05449 
(0.1254) 
0.0551 
(0.1077) 
0.0535 
(0.1144) 
0.0797 
(0.1178) 
0.0251 
(0.0959) 
Charlson Score -0.3042 
(0.5579) 
0.0158 
(0.3855) 
0.2117 
(0.4489) 
0.1544 
(0.4686) 
-0.6942** 
(0.3207) 
Proportion discharged to skilled 
nursing facility 
-0.00901 
(0.0345) 
-0.0256 
(0.0340) 
-0.0315 
(0.0320) 
-0.0272 
(0.0325) 
0.0143 
(0.0204) 
(intercept) 0.3764 
(0.2346) 
0.4622** 
(0.1937) 
0.3050 
(0.2085) 
0.2857 
(0.2164) 
0.3745 
(0.1863) 
      
N treatment hospitals 36 19 44 52 36 
N comparison hospitals 36 44 20 12 36 
N hospitals×years 287 247 249 245 287 
N patients 55,478 46,823 45,472 46,696 55,478 
N readmitted patients 5,706 4,788 4,705 4,787 1,290 
      
R2 0.56 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.55 
      
Notes: OLS estimates of 𝛿መ଺ and 𝛿መ଻from regression (2). All estimates from regressions containing hospital and year fixed effects and 
covariates identified in Table 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Hospitals and patients selected by criteria described in section IVB. 
Radius X indicates that the estimates are based on treatment/comparison groups formed on the basis of a HHI calculated with a radius of X 
km defining the boundary of a market. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
